Abstract-This paper analyzes the impact of peer effects on electricity consumption of a network of rational, utilitymaximizing users. Users derive utility from consuming electricity as well as consuming less energy than their neighbors. However, a disutility is incurred for consuming more than their neighbors. To maximize the profit of the load-serving entity that provides electricity to such users, we develop a two-stage gametheoretic model, where the entity sets the prices in the first stage. In the second stage, consumers decide on their demand in response to the observed price set in the first stage so as to maximize their utility. To this end, we derive theoretical statements under which such peer effects reduce aggregate user consumption. Further, we obtain expressions for the resulting electricity consumption and profit of the load serving entity for the case of perfect price discrimination and a single price under complete information, and approximations under incomplete information. Simulations suggest that exposing only a selected subset of all users to peer effects maximizes the entity's profit.
I. INTRODUCTION
Energy efficiency programs have emerged as a viable resource to yield economic benefits to utility systems and to reduce the amount of greenhouse gas emissions. Demandside management aims to modify consumer demand through financial incentive schemes and to induce behavioral changes through education. Specifically, users are offered rewards to conserve energy during peak hours or to shift usage to off-peak times. With communications and information technology constantly improving, which are characteristic elements of today's smart grid, demand-side management technologies are becoming increasingly feasible.
Previous academic work by psychologists, political scientists, and behavioral economists has found that social comparisons can have a significant impact on people's behavior, exploiting the willingness of individuals to conform to a standard, receive social acclaim, or simply the belief that other people's choices are informative in the presence of limited or imperfect information [1] , [2] .
Motivated by this line of academic work and the pressing need to improve energy efficiency, various companies and groups have conducted randomized control trials to investigate the impact of peer effects on energy consumption of residential households by sending out energy reports to users, comparing their usage to their closest neighbors [3] . While all experiments unanimously found an average reduction among the highest consuming users of around 1-2% [4] , ambiguous results were found among low consumers.
Network effects in social networks and platforms often exhibit positive externalities, capturing the intuitive fact that an increased amount of platform activity promotes a local increase in platform activity [5] . From a game-theoretic perspective, it is known that an analysis of games under such strategic complements admits well-behaved solutions if utility functions are supermodular with parameters drawn from a lattice [6] , [7] . Examples for such games can be found in modeling technology adoption, human capital decisions, and criminal networks [8] . The opposite effect, that is, in games of strategic substitutes where an increased amount of activity leads to local reductions of activity, is observed in information sharing and the provision of public goods [9] .
In an attempt to characterize the most influential players in a network, [10] develops a quadratic model with continuous action spaces, a parameterization which we employ in this paper. Other research directions aiming at understanding the impact of network effects on social phenomena include diffusion models for the spread of information with the goal of influence maximization [11] , repeated games to learn user interactions over time [12] , or the analysis of systemic risk and stability [13] in financial networks. The problem of profit maximization of a monopolist selling a divisible good, which is closely related with our work, has been investigated in [14] , where the authors assume a constant marginal cost of production. However, to the best of our knowledge, a modeling approach for the impact of peer effects on energy consumption, whose generation typically has quadratic marginal cost, has yet to be formulated.
In this paper, we propose a two-stage game-theoretic model for the energy consumption of a network of users, serviced by a load-serving entity obligated to cover their energy demand. We analytically solve for the equilibria of this game under full information of the network structure and users' parameters to characterize the influence of peer effects on aggregate consumption and utility profit, for both the case of perfect price discrimination and a single price valid for all users. For the case of incomplete information, we obtain approximations of the utility's profit, user consumptions, and the optimal pricing scheme. Further, we analyze the profitmaximization problem by selecting the best subset of users to be exposed to peer effects, and present a heuristic solution to this NP-hard selection problem. Lastly, we provide theoretical statements on the properties of users which ensure that the consumption under peer effects is reduced. All proofs are relegated to the full version of this paper [15] .
II. GAME-THEORETIC MODEL

A. Players
Define the set of consumers as I = {1, . . . , n}. Let W ∈ R n×n define the interaction matrix which describes the network links and strengths between users. More precisely, let w ij ∈ [0, 1] denote the strength of influence of user j on i. We assume w ii = 0 ∀ i ∈ I and normalize the row sums, j∈I w ij = 1 ∀ i ∈ I. Each element w ij > 0 in W corresponds to a directed edge from agent j to agent i, that is, the adjacency matrix G of the resulting directed graph is the transpose of W . Each user i derives a utility u i ∈ R from consuming x i units of electricity as follows:
In (1), a i and b i denote user-specific parameters to describe the concave and increasing direct utility from consuming x i units of electricity, and p i denotes the unit price set by the utility. The last term captures the strategic complementarity between user i and its neighbors. It is positive if user i consumes less than the average of its neighbors, and vice versa. The difference between the average consumption and the user consumption is scaled by a proportionality constant γ i and the consumption level x i .
Since each user consumes x i units of electricity at unit price p i , the utility's profit reads as follows:
where the marginal cost of production 2c i x i is assumed to be linear in the production quantity x i , which is a standard and often made assumption. For expositional ease, we further assume that the utility generates electricity itself and does not procure it from the wholesale electricity market. Relaxing this assumption would introduce uncertainty in wholesale prices, a problem which is outside the scope of this paper.
B. Two-Stage Game
To model the hierarchy between the utility, which acts as a monopolist that has the power to set prices, and the users, we formulate a two-stage game as follows:
1) The utility determines the optimal price p * so as to maximize its profit by taking into account users' consumption decisions as a function of any particular price vector p, that is,
2) Each agent observes the price p * i and x −i and consumes x * i units of electricity so as to maximize her utility, that is,
We will solve this two-stage game by finding a subgame perfect equilibrium for the cases of perfect price discrimination and a single price for all users. We also differentiate between the full-information case where the utility has knowledge about all {a i } 
Theorem 1. Given the price vector p and consumption vector x −i , the utility maximizing response of user i is
Further, {x * 1 , . . . , x * n } constitute a unique Nash Equilibrium of the second stage game.
Recall that w ii = 0 ∀ i ∈ I, which allows the right hand side of (4) to depend on x −i only. Assumption 1 is necessary to ensure that (4) is indeed a maximum attained at a nonnegative value. With the definitions B := diag (2b 1 , . . . , 2b n ) and Γ := diag (γ 1 , . . . , γ n ), (4) can be rewritten as
Definition 1 (Katz-Bonacich Centrality [16] , [17] ). Given the adjacency matrix G, the weight vector w, and the scalar
where ρ(G) denotes the spectral radius of G, the weighted Katz-Bonacich Centrality is defined as
K w (G, α) = (I − αG) −1 w = ∞ k=0 (αG) k w.(6)
The centrality of a particular node i can be interpreted as the sum of total number of walks from i to its neighbors discounted exponentially by α and weighted by w i .
For the special case γ 1 = . . . = γ n = γ, and noting that G = W , (5) can be rewritten in terms of the weighted Katz-Bonacich Centrality:
We note that (B + 2Γ − ΓW ) is strictly diagonally dominant for all γ ≥ 0, with positive diagonal entries. The Gershgorin Circle Theorem then states that all its eigenvalues are strictly positive, from which invertibility follows. We first focus on the full information case and present the equilibria in Theorems 2 and 3. Let C = diag(c 1 , . . . , c n ).
Theorem 2. Under perfect price discrimination, the profitmaximizing solution p
* to the first stage game is
The four components are interpreted as follows:
2) An additional cost that correlates with cost c i , 3) An incentive for strongly influential users W Γ, 4) An additional cost for strongly influenced users ΓW .
The optimal consumption under this policy is
For the special case of symmetric networks, i.e. W = W , the optimal profit Π * becomes 
and the consumption equilibrium writes
where 
By construction of the optimal prices and consumptions, the optimal profit under a single price is less than under perfect price discrimination, that is, Π * u ≥ Π * . Next, for the incomplete information scenario and additional assumptions W = W and C = cI, the utility can approximate the profit-maximizing price as in Theorem 4. 
III. THEORETICAL STATEMENTS
We next seek to analyze under what conditions the aggregate consumption across all users is less than in the absence of peer effects, which is a desirable goal from the energy efficiency perspective. Theorem 7 describes conditions on the average consumption of any particular user's neighbors to observe a "boomerang effect", given there is a unique "high" consumer among a pool of users of identical characteristics. 
where x j , j ∈ {3, . . . , n} is given by
For the special case of n = 2, this condition reads
Theorem 8 states that if two connected users both receive notifications of their neighbors' consumption, the sum of their consumptions decreases as long as they are not "too different" from each other and their neighbors. Thus, the total consumption of a network of users correlates negatively with the number of users given the treatment. Analogous bounds can be found for exposing more than two users to the peer effect at the expense of notational ease.
Finally, we investigate the case of incomplete information about the network structure for the case of symmetric networks, i.e. W = W . It is assumed that the monopolist only knows an approximation of W , denoted withW , wherẽ W =W . Under perfect price discrimination, the utility can set profit-maximizing prices in the first stage of the game, assuming that users' consumptionx in the first stage is determined according toW . The real consumption x * , however, follows the actual W (which is unknown to the utility). Theorem 9 provides a lower bound on the ratio of the optimal expected profit under network uncertainty to the profit obtainable under perfect network information. 
Theorem 9 (Uncertainty in W
where · 2 is the Euclidian matrix norm.
For the edge caseW = 0, we have W 2 = 1 due to the well-known fact that the maximal eigenvalue of an adjacency matrix is the degree of the graph. Due to row normalizations of W , the degree is 1, which corresponds to the eigenvector 1 associated with eigenvalue 1. It is easy to see that the bound (16) increases asW approaches W (see [15] for more eludication on technicalities).
To illustrate the bound (16), let n = 24 and W ∈ R
24×24
be the ground truth interaction matrix of 12 randomly chosen, fully connected users, whose parameters a i , b i , and c i ∀ i ∈ I are randomly drawn from appropriate distributions. Assuming that the monopolist knows that 12 out of 24 users are fully connected, we iterate through all 24 12 combinations and calculate W − W 2 and the profit bound (16) as a function of the number of correct user assignments, where we take the mean across any particular number of correct assignments. As the number of correct assignments increases, the metric for the mismatch between W andW , namely W − W 2 decreases, whereas the profit bound increases, see Figure 1 . 
Theorem 10 (Efficiency
x o = C + B 2 + Γ − W Γ 2 − ΓW 2 −1 a 2 .(17)
IV. COMPARISON OF PRICING SCHEMES A. Network Topologies
In the remainder of this paper, we assume users to be connected to each other through one of the basic network topologies displayed in Figure 2 . 
B. Simulation
We now simulate the consumption and price equilibria as well as the profit of the monopolist as a function of the network strength parameter γ under the following three pricing scenarios: and sets the lower bound on the single price (13a). We simulate a network of n = 10 fully connected users with a i and b i randomly drawn from uniform distributions with support [8, 12] and [0.75, 1.25], respectively. The cost is set to c i = 2 for all users. Repeating this process 10,000 times and taking the mean across all iterations yields the characteristics in Table I . As the results for the star and ring network are qualitatively similar to the fully connected network, we omit discussions of these cases.
As expected, the profit under perfect price discrimination (7) exceeds the profit obtained with cases (2) and (3), where, somewhat surprisingly, setting the lower bound on the prices (case (3)) does not give up too much profit, compared to case (2) . This indicates that the lower bound on the optimal price (13a) is "close" to the actual optimum, which is illustrated by the second row of Table I , from which it follows that (13a) falls short of (10) by less than < 1%.
Consequently, the lower price bound (13a) results in a higher average user consumption than in case (2), which directly follows from the consumption equilibrium (4) (10) and (13a), average user consumption, and maximum consumption under perfect price discrimination (bold font), single pricing under complete information (10) (italics), and single pricing under incomplete information (13a) (regular font). 10,000 iterations, a ∼ unif [8, 12] 
average user consumption under perfect price discrimination is sandwiched between cases (2) and (3). Lastly, the maximum user consumption for perfect price discrimination is about 30% lower than in cases (2) and (3), which has beneficial side-effects on grid operation. This observation also motivates the heuristic user-selection algorithm presented in the next section.
V. PROFIT MAXIMIZATION WITH USER SELECTION
A. Problem Formulation
We now seek to answer the following question: Given the single, exogenous price p and the parameters
and {b i } n i=1 sampled from distributions with means E[a] and E[b], respectively and are known to the monopolist, which users should be targeted to maximize profit? This situation can arise if the utility is obligated to charge customers at a rate p per unit of electricity and only wants to spend a limited budget on informing users about their peers' behavior. This profit maximizing problem of the utility writes
where Δ = diag(δ 1 , . . . , δ n ) and δ i = 1 and δ i = 0 denote that user i is targeted or non-targeted, respectively. This is an NP-hard Mixed Integer Quadratically Constrained Program (MIQCP) due to the binary constraint to expose exactly m, 0 ≤ m ≤ n users to the network effect and the quadratic objective, and so (18) does not admit a closed form solution. An analytical solution requires exhaustive search, which is computationally infeasible for any real network of users. Therefore, we resort to the following heuristic which was hinted at at the end of Section IV: Given the user parameters a and b and the single price p, we first compute the consumptions in the absence of any network effects, denoted withx = B −1 (a − p1). Next, we calculate the optimal consumptions with the expectations of E[a] and E[b], which we denote with E[x]. Lastly, the pairwise differences The idea of this heuristic is motivated by Theorem 7, according to which a high consumer in a network of low consumers can result in a consumption increase of low consumers. Since the user parameters are sampled from a finite distribution, a single price on non-identical users always results in suboptimal profit, but approaches optimality as users become more similar. Exposing the highest and lowest consumers (measured against E[x]) to the network effect nudges high users (low users) to consume less (more), thereby making the users more similar in their consumption.
This notion is further corroborated by the fact that the maximum user consumption under perfect price discrimination (achieving larger profit than single pricing, see Table I ) is about 30 % lower than under single pricing. According to Theorem 7, such users reduce their consumption in response to the peer effect, which reduces the maximum user consumption to increase profit.
The utility needs to find the sweet spot between the following two extremes: Targeting too few users results in a suboptimal increase in profit. On the other hand, according to Theorem 8, targeting too many users leads to an overall consumption decrease because targeting a customer whose neighbors are already exposed to the network causes the neighbors to reduce their consumption further.
B. Simulation
We let c i = 2, n = 10 as in Section IV and analyze all three network topologies depicted in Figure 2 . a i and b i are sampled from the same uniform distributions. We set the exogenous price as the profit-maximizing price in the absence of peer effects (14a), from which the expected consumption E[x] is determined with (14b). The analytical solution to the MIQCP (18) is determined with Gurobi [18] . We repeat this calculation 10,000 times and take the mean across all iterations. To describe the performance of the heuristic, we define the performance metric S as follows:
where Π * m and Π h m denote the profit under the analytical solution of (18) and the heuristic with m targeted users, respectively. Π E denotes the profit in the absence of any peer effects (m = 0) achieved with exogenous price p where the users consume according tox = B −1 (a − p1). S m captures the fraction of the heuristic's achieved profit improvement of the total possible improvement. Figure 3 shows the objective for the heuristic Π h (solid lines) and analytical solution Π * (colored dashed line) for all network topologies as a function of m. The expected profit with m = 0 follows by taking the expectation of the profit
, which is depicted as the black dashed line. Further, the percentage of cases where the heuristic selects the identical subset of users as the analytical solution is depicted in the second subplot. S m and the maximum user consumption as a function of m are provided in the third and fourth subplot, respectively. For all network topologies, it can be seen that the optimal solution to (18) achieves an increase in profit by ≈ 1% for m ∈ {2, 3, 4} compared to the case of no targeting, while at the same time reducing the peak consumption by ≈ 4%. The performance of the heuristic decreases in the number of consumers targeted and reaches its minimum at ≈ 75%, ≈ 82%, and ≈ 90% for the ring, star, and fully connected network, respectively. The percentage of optimal choices across all 10,000 iterations is always > 22%. These results suggest that the presented heuristic achieves a good approximation of the optimal solution, which is NP-hard and computationally intractable for larger, real-world networks.
VI. CONCLUSION
Motivated by home energy reports that benchmark the consumption of individual users against their neighbors, we proposed a two-stage game-theoretic model for a network of electricity consumers, in which each consumer seeks to optimize her individual utility function that includes a peer effect term. Specifically, users derive positive utility from consuming less energy than the average of their neighbors, and vice versa. We investigated profit-maximizing pricing schemes for the complete and incomplete information scenario as well as for the single price and perfect price discrimination case. We provided theoretical statements with regard to overall consumption, efficiency, and profit under network uncertainty. For the case of targeting only a subset of all available consumers under an exogenous single price, we formulated the monopolist's profit maximization problem. This NP-hard optimization problem was solved with a heuristic approach, which targets those users who deviate most from the expected consumption in the hypothetical absence of peer effects. Compared to the analytical solution, this heuristic was shown to achieve acceptable accuracy.
This work could be extended by incorporating time. In particular, if we allow the monopolist to also procure electricity from the wholesale market whose prices are fluctuating, an algorithmic and online treatment of this problem becomes necessary. The goal then becomes to learn user preferences and the network structure over time. Further, the selection problem to target the most valuable users for the objective of profit maximization calls for modeling peer effects in auction settings, where the desired goal is to design a truthful and incentive compatible mechanism to elicit user preferences.
